Abstract-We consider a multi-agent scenario with K ≥ 2 agents that have partial information about some random nature state, and that take actions in a repeated manner. Each agent also has imperfect observations of the other agents' past actions and the nature state realization. Our goal is to characterize the set of asymptotically implementable distributions on the agents' actions and the nature state. We solve this problem for general K when all agents have only causal nature state information (NSI) and for K = 2 when: one agent has causal NSI and the other agent has non-causal NSI; or in some special cases when both agents have non-causal NSI.
I. INTRODUCTION
This paper solves a few special instances of the following general problem. Consider K ≥ 2 agents, where Agent k ∈ {1, . . . , K} produces time-t action 1 x k,t ∈ X k for t ∈ {1, . . . , T }, T ≥ 1. Each agent has access to some observations associated with the chosen actions and the realization of a random process {S 0,t } T t=1 = {S 0,1 , ..., S 0,T } ∈ S T 0 , which models some process of interest. We call {S 0,t } the nature states. The agents' actions and the nature states also affect the agents' individual payoff functions {ω k } K k=1 , where ω k : S 0 × X 1 × ... × X K → R. The main problem under investigation is to characterize, for a given observation structure, the set of feasible average payoffs
ω k (s 0,t , x 1,t , ..., x K,t ), k ∈ {1, . . . , K}, (1) in the limit T → ∞. Let P S0,tX1,t...X K,t denote the joint distribution on the (K + 1)−tuple (S 0 , X 1 , ..., X K ) at time t. By definition, the set of feasible average payoffs is fully characterized by the set of averaged distributions 1 T T t=1 P S0,tX1,t...X K,t (s 0 , x 1 , ..., x K ) that can be induced by the agents' strategies. To reuse the terminology of [1] , [2] , in the limit T → ∞, this set will be referred to as the set of implementable distributions (see Definition 1) . Characterizing the set of implementable distributions for this general problem is a challenging problem, which motivates the definition of intermediate problems such as those reported in this paper.
The first special instance of the general problem described above is due to Gossner et al. [1] , who addressed the two-agent case when: the nature states {S 0,t } T t=1 are i.i.d. (independent 1 Throughout the paper, we assume that all alphabets such as X k are finite. and identically distributed); at any time t ∈ {1, . . . , T }, Agent 1 knows the past, present, and future realizations of the nature state (s 0,1 , ..., s 0,T ); Agent 2 knows the past realizations of the nature state (s 0,1 , ..., s 0,t−1 ); and both Agents 1 and 2 have perfect observation of the past actions (x 1,1 , x 2,1 , ..., x 1,t−1 , x 2,t−1 ). The problem is solved in [1] ; Cuff and Zhao presented an alternative proof [3] of the results in [1] based on more traditional information-theoretic tools and under the coordination via actions framework. In [2] , the authors address the more general case where at time t ∈ {2, ..., T } Agent 2 has access to the past realizations of nature state (s 0,1 , s 0,2 , ..., s 0,t−1 ) and to observations (y 2,1 , y 2,2 , . . . , y 2,t−1 ) that are modeled as the outputs of a discrete memoryless channel (DMC) Γ(y 2,t |x 1,t ); this setup has independently been addressed in [4] . The work of [2] was further developed in [5, 6] , where at time t Agent 2 has access to the past outputs (y 2,1 , ..., y 2,t−1 ) of a more general statedependent DMC Γ(y 2,t |s 0,t , x 1,t , x 2,t ), but not necessarily to the past realizations (s 0,1 , . . . , s 0,t−1 ) of the nature state.
In contrast to the above works, in the present paper we consider more symmetric scenarios where each agent k ∈ {1, 2} has nature state information (NSI) about {S 0,t } and observes past outputs (y k,1 , . . . , y k,t−1 ) from a state-dependent discrete memoryless network Γ(y 1,t , y 2,t |s 0,t , x 1,t , x 2,t ). Moreover, the NSI at the two agents can be only partial. We also make a step toward the multi-agent scenario with K > 2 by discussing the complexity of the problem and providing first results.
II. GENERAL PROBLEM FORMULATION We explain our assumptions in more detail. The nature states {S 0,t } T t=1 are i.i.d. according to the law ρ 0 . Each Agent k's NSI, k ∈ {1, ..., K}, is modeled by the sequence {S k,t } T t=1 ∈ S T k , where the (K + 1)-tuples {(S 0,t , S 1,t , ..., S K,t )} T t=1 are i.i.d. according to the joint distribution ρ 0 (s 0 ) × (s 1 , ..., s K |s 0 ), with s k ∈ S k . The observations {Y k,t } at Agent k are best modeled through a state-dependent network that at each time t takes as inputs the agents' actions X 1,t , ..., X K,t and the nature state S 0,t , and produces as outputs the observations Y 1,t , ..., Y K,t . We assume that this network is memoryless and is described by a stationary channel law Γ(y 1 , ..., y K |s 0, , x 1 , ..., x K ), i.e., that
(2) on top of the next page holds. We distinguish between two scenarios. In the first scenario, Agent k has causal NSI, i.e., it produces its time-t action X k,t as
for some σ
k,t } 1≤t≤T is also referred to as the strategy of Agent k under causal NSI. In the second scenario, Agent k has non-causal NSI, i.e., it produces its time-t action X k,t as
The scenario where an agent k has strictly-causal NSI is contained in the scenario where the agent has no NSI at all, because strictly-causal NSI can always be modeled with an enhanced output
The main issue at stake is to find the average joint distributions that can asymptotically be induced by some strategy profilei.e., by some vector of strategies at agents 1, . . . , K. This is precisely the notion of implementability defined next.
implementable if for every
> 0 and sufficiently large T ≥ 1 there exists a strategy profile (σ c1 1,t , . . . , σ cK K,t ) 1≤t≤T which induces at each time t a joint distribution P S0,tX1,t···X K,t on the
The main purpose of this paper is to characterize the set of implementable distributions, which we will denote Q.
III. RESULTS FOR THE TWO-AGENT CASE
In this section we focus on K = 2 agents. We first characterize the set of implementable distributions Q when both agents have causal NSI. As our result illustrates, in this case Q is not increased by communicating over the network.
Theorem 1: Let c 1 = c 2 = c. The set of implementable distributions Q consists of the marginal distributions
where P U and {P X k |U S k } 2 k=1 are arbitrary (conditional) distributions over a finite set U and over X 1 and X 2 .
Proof: Omitted. Communication over the network can enlarge the set of implementable distributions Q when at least one of the two agents has non-causal NSI. At first we assume that only Agent 1 has non-causal NSI while Agent 2 has causal NSI.
Theorem 2: Let c 1 = nc and c 2 = c. In this case the set of implementable distributions Q consists of the marginals Q(s 0 ,
and that satisfy the mutual information constraint
(5b)
Proof: Omitted. In the special case where Agent 2 has no NSI at all i.e., S 2 = const. and Agent 1 has perfect NSI S 1 = S 0 , Theorem 2 recovers a result in [5] [6] ; in this case the auxiliary random variable U can be replaced by Agent 2's action X 2 .
It can be seen that the set of implementable distributions Q in Theorem 2 depends only on Agent 2's observation Y 2 but not Y 1 . This shows that a communication from Agent 2-who has only causal NSI-to Agent 1 does not enlarge Q.
In Proposition 1 we extend the strategy profiles leading to Theorem 2 to a symmetric scenario where both agents have non-causal NSI. A key feature of the new strategies is that the agents use a Wyner-Ziv source-code [7] instead of a standard source-code. For this reason the left-hand side of (6b) in Proposition 1 shows the Wyner-Ziv source-coding rate I(S 1 ; U 1 |S 2 ) whereas the left-hand side of (5b) in Theorem 2 shows the standard source-coding rate I(S 1 ; U ).
Proposition 1:
and that satisfy the mutual information constraints
Proof: See Section V. We have a matching converse (Theorem 3) to this Proposition 1 for two special cases where Agent 2 cannot convey any interesting information to Agent 1. Either because there is no way to communicate, see Condition (7), or because Agent 1 is already aware of Agent 2's NSI, see Condition (8) .
The special case meeting Condition (7) is of particular interest to power control problems in interference channels [2] . Indeed, it can be checked that (7) 
Theorem 3: Let c 1 = c 2 = nc. Assume further that one of the following two conditions holds:
• the network transition law (2) is of the form
for some conditional probability distribution Γ; or • Agent 1 can compute Agent 2's NSI because
for some function f :
In this case, the subset of Q described in Proposition 1 is exactly the set of implementable distributions Q.
Proof: See Section VI. For general scenarios the set of implementable distributions presented in Proposition 1 should be enlarged if the strategies in Section V are modified so as to employ Kaspi's two-way source coding [8] instead of non-interactive Wyner-Ziv coding.
Remark 2: In many applications, an agent might have both causal and non-causal NSI. For example, when the state {S 0,t } models the weather at some location, on the one hand the agent can obtain rough non-causal NSI from annual statistics, and on the other hand it obtains much more reliable causal NSI by observing the weather at its own location or through weather forecasts. Our model and results are easily generalized in this sense. In particular, for the scenario with mixed causal and non-causal CIS at both agents, the set of implementable distributions Q can be derived when Condition (7) or (8) 
. Thus, as for two agents, communication does not enlarge the set of implementable distributions Q when the agents only have causal NSI.
B. Non-causal NSI at all agents
The general problem is very hard, and includes in particular the general joint source-channel coding problem as a special case. This follows from the following proposition:
Proposition 2: Consider a network with transition law Γ that neither depends on the state S 0 nor on the actions of Agents j + 1, . . . , K. That means, for some conditional law Γ: Γ(y 1 , . . . , y K |s 0 , x 1 , . . . , x K ) = Γ(y 1 , . . . , y K |x 1 , . . . , x j ). (9) Assume non-causal NSI at all Agents 1, . . . , K (c 1 = · · · = c K = nc) and that we are interested only in coordinating the actions of Agents j + 1, . . . , K with state s 0 .
In this case, the set of implementable distributions is unchanged if Agents j + 1, . . . , K can wait to produce their actions until they have observed all their channel outputs, i.e.,
Proof: Omitted. Notice that the joint source-channel coding problem is open for almost all networks, including the "simple" 3-node multi-access, broadcast, and relay channels. Characterizing the set of implementable distributions Q even for these 3-node networks thus seems out of reach. Based on the strategy profiles presented in Section V, one can however readily identify subsets of Q.
To see this, we briefly recall the strategy profiles presented in Section V. They operate over subblocks of length n. Agent k constructs its subblock-b actions X k,(b−1)n+1 , . . . , X k,bn by first Wyner-Ziv source-coding its subblock-(b + 1) state sequence S k,bn+1 , . . . , S k,(b+1)n and then Gel'fand-Pinsker channel-coding [9] the resulting compression index. 4 At the end of block b, Agent k decodes the other agent's Gelfand-Pinsker code and reconstructs the compressed version of the other agent's block-(b + 1) state sequence. Thus, each agent knows the compressed versions of both block-(b + 1) state sequences (S 1,bn+1 , . . . , S 1,(b+1)n ) and (S 2,bn+1 , . . . , S 2,(b+1)n ) already before block b + 1 starts. It can thus use these compressed sequences as additional sideinformation in the block-(b + 1) Gel'fand-Pinsker codes.
These strategies can be employed over any general network. They can be improved, for example, by replacing the pointto-point Gel'fand-Pinsker codes through a network Gel'fandPinsker code [11, 12] that is tailored to the structure of the network. Or the Wyner-Ziv compression can be replaced by a network source-code [13] - [15] or coordination-code [16] .
For some choices of the network Gel'fand-Pinsker codes or the network source-codes, the overall coding idea has to be slightly modified, for example by introducing an additional block of look-ahead in the forward encoding. This is in particular the case for the following cascade scenario with 3 agents, where the channel law Γ decomposes as Γ(y 2 , y 3 |s 0 , x 1 , x 2 ) = Γ 1 (y 2 |s 0 , x 1 ) · Γ 2 (y 3 |s 0 , x 2 ), (11) and where Agent 1 has non-causal NSI S 1,t = S 0,t and Agents 2 and 3 have no NSI at all. We let Agent 1 use the optimal cascade source-code [15] to compress each b-th subblock of its state sequence, S 0,(b−1)n+1 , . . . , S 0,bn , and to send the resulting two compression indices in block b − 2 to Agent 2. Agent 2 then forwards one the two compression indices to Agent 3 in the next block b−1. The sketched strategy profile leads to the following: Proposition 3 (3-agent cascade network): The set of implementable distributions Q for the described scenario contains the marginals Q (s 0 , x 1 , x 2 , x 3 ) of all joint distributions Q(s 0 , v 2 , v 3 , x 1 , x 2 , x 3 , y 1 , y 2 ) that factorize as
and that satisfy the following two conditions
Proof: Omitted. The above subset of Q indeed coincides with Q in the special case when Γ 2 does not depend on s 0 . In general the subset inclusion is however strict.
satisfying the three conditions (6) in the theorem.
Fix small 3 > 2 > 1 > 0, and pick positive rates R 1 , R 2 ,R 1 ,R 2 , R 1 , R 2 so that
and
By conditions (6b) and (6c) such rates exist. Codebooks generation: Split the blocklength T into B blocks each of length n T /B . For each block b ∈ {1, . . . , B} and each Agent k ∈ {1, 2} randomly generate a codebook C (b) U k containing the n-length codewords {u
nR k } and ν k ∈ {1, . . . , 2 nR k } by drawing all entries of all codewords i.i.d. according to the marginal distribution Q U k .
5 Independent thereof, randomly generate for each block b ∈ {1, . . . , B} 5 In this section all marginals are meant with respect to the joint distribution Strategies at Agent k ∈ {1, 2}: Let i
(1)
Before transmission starts, for each block b ∈ {2, . . . , B}, Agent k looks for a pair of indices i
If there is at least one such pair of indices, it picks one of them at random. Otherwise it declares an error. Agent k, further setsî
and looks for an index ν
Analysis: Omitted.
VI. PROOF OF THEOREM 3
Let Q(s 0 , x 1 , x 2 ) be an implementable distribution. Fix > 0. By definition, there exists a sufficiently large blocklength T and strategies {σ such that for each t ∈ {1, . . . , T }, the tuple (S 0,t , X 1,t , X 2,t ) induced by these strategies has a joint law P S0,tX1,tX2,t that satisfies
Let Z be a random variable that is uniformly distributed over {1, . . . , T } independent of S T 0 , S
and define for each t,
Let
Denote the probability distribution of (S 0 , S 1 , S 2 , U, V, X 1 , X 2 , Y 1 , Y 2 ) by P S0S1S2U V X1X2Y1Y2 , and the probability distribution of (S 0 , X 1 , X 2 ) by Q S0X1X2 . It can be shown that by these definitions,
for some conditional probability laws P U V X1|S1 (u, v, x 1 |s 1 ) and P X2|U S2 (x 2 |u, s 2 ). In the following, we prove that I P (S 1 ; U |S 2 ) ≤ I P (V ; Y 2 , S 2 |U ) − I Q (V ; S 1 |U ).
Recall (18) and (21) and that > 0 can be chosen arbitrarily small. By continuity, (22) and (23) imply that there must exist a conditional probability distribution Q U V S1S2|S0X1X2 so that the joint distribution Q S0X1X2 × Q U V S1S2|S0X1X2 × Γ factorizes as ρ 0 (s 0 ) (s 1 , s 2 |s 0 )Q U V X1|S1 (u, v, x 1 |s 1 ) ×Q X2|U S2 (x 2 |u, s 2 )Γ(y 1 , y 2 |s 0 , x 1 ),
and satisfies the mutual information constraint
To prove (23), we notice that on one hand, 
where (a) follows by the i.i.d-ness of the sequence {S 1,t }; and the last two equalities by the definitions of (Z, U Z , V Z , S 1,Z ) and (U, V, S 1 ) and the independence of Z and S 1 .
On the other hand, by the definitions of (U Z 
By Csiszár's telescoping identity [17] , the left-hand sides of (26) and (27) coincide, and thus:
which by chain rule of mutual information and by the Markov chain (U, V ) − −S 1 − −S 2 is equivalent to I P (S 1 ; U |S 2 ) ≤ I P (V ; Y 2 |U, S 2 ) − I P (V ; S 1 |U, S 2 ) = I P (V ; Y 2 , S 2 |U ) − I P (V ; S 1 , S 2 |U ) = I P (V ; Y 2 , S 2 |U ) − I P (V ; S 1 |U ). (29)
